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United States v. Tull: A Polluter's Right
To A Jury Trial
I. Introduction
In United States v. Tull,1 the Supreme Court held that
the Seventh Amendment requires a jury trial to determine lia-
bility in suits brought by the government pursuant to the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972
(Clean Water Act).2 The Court further held that a jury deter-
mination of the amount of the penalty to be assessed was not
guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment.3 Tull reversed the
decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit which
had denied the defendant's timely demand for a jury trial, on
the grounds that the government was asking the District
Court to "exercise statutorily conferred equitable power in de-
termining the amount of the fine,"" rather than asking for a
"penalty analogous to a remedy at law."' 5 The Fourth Circuit
affirmed the holding of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia which ordered injunctive relief
as well as payment of $75,000 in civil penalties by Tull.'
This note analyzes the right to a jury trial of one accused
of violating the Clean Water Act based on an interpretation of
the Seventh Amendment which the Supreme Court has devel-
oped and refined over the years. Part II provides a brief re-
view of the background of the right to a jury trial. Part III
discusses the facts of Tull and the lower court decisions. Part
IV analyzes the Supreme Court's treatment of the right to a
civil jury trial in cases involving both legal and equitable
1. 107 S. Ct. 1831 (1987).
2. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
3. Tull, 107 S. Ct. at 1840.
4. 769 F.2d 182, 187 (4th Cir. 1985).
5. Id.
6. 615 F. Supp. 610, 626-27 (E.D. Va. 1983). For a breakdown of the penalty
allocation, see infra note 44.
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claims. Part V provides an analysis of Tull in light of that
background, and Part VI concludes that this decision repre-
sents the Supreme Court's continued strict construction of the
Seventh Amendment, and contends that the Court should
have allowed the jury to determine the amount of the civil
penalty.
II. Background
Over two centuries ago, William Blackstone described the
civil jury trial as "the glory of the English law."' While the
precise origin of the civil jury trial remains somewhat of a
mystery, legal scholars estimate that the modern version of
this judicial entity took form by the year 1408.8 Realizing the
importance of the civil jury trial in the English system, that
right was written into the United States Constitution by the
framers.'
The Seventh Amendment provides:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall
be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be other-
wise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law.'
The Seventh Amendment right has been strictly upheld
throughout U.S. judicial history. As Justice Sutherland so ac-
curately explained in Dimick v. Schiedt," "[m]aintenance of
the jury as a fact-finding body is of such importance and occu-
pies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any
seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scru-
7. 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 379 (Bell ed. 1972).
8. D. Nasmith, The Institutes of English Public Law 141 (1980).
9. U.S. Const. amend. VII (1791). See generally Higginbotham, Continuing The
Dialogue: Civil Jury Trials and The Allocation Of Judicial Power, 56 Tex. L. Rev. 47
(1977). Even prior to the adoption of the Constitution, there is evidence that the jury
trial right was preserved in the United States; the original settlers incorporated it
into the Jamestown charter. In re U.S. Financial Securities Litigation, 609 F.2d 411,
420 (9th Cir. 1979).
10. U.S. Const. amend. VII.
11. 293 U.S. 474 (1934).
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tinized with the utmost care."12 In Jacob v. City of New
York,' 3 the Supreme Court noted that "[a] right so fundamen-
tal and sacred to the citizen, whether guaranteed by the Con-
stitution or provided by statute, should be jealously guarded
by the courts."' 4
The Seventh Amendment only requires a jury trial for
"suits at common law." 15 Thus, while such actions have his-
torically been granted a jury trial,16 suits in equity17 have been
tried to the court.'8 The phrase "Suits at common law" was
first defined by the Supreme Court in Parsons v. Bedford,19 in
which Justice Story stated that such actions were "not merely
suits which the common law recognized among its old and set-
tled proceedings, but suits in which legal rights were to be
ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to those
where equitable rights alone were recognized, and equitable
12. Id. at 486; see also United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37 (1914) (holding that
in civil actions, juries are to decide factual issues by a reasonable preponderance of
the evidence).
13. 315 U.S. 752 (1942).
14. Id. at 752-53.
15. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(d) this right may be waived. Furthermore, the right
is not automatic, but must be affirmatively demanded by one of the parties to the
action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(b).
16. James, Right To A Jury Trial In Civil Actions, 72 Yale L.J. 655 (1963).
17. At common law, a citizen of England could, in some instances, take his case
into the Court of Chancery to seek equitable remedies. The equity courts evolved into
a parallel system of justice, existing side by side with the courts of law. The chancery
system developed its own system of principles and rules.
In the United States, the federal government, as well as most of the states, has
merged law and equity into one system. As in England, though, equity remains an
"extraordinary" remedy. One may seek equity only if there is not an adequate rem-
edy at law. Although the same courts now administer both legal and equitable relief,
equity jurisdiction requires that its own principles be applied. 30 C.J.S. Equity §§ 1-
10, 18-21 (1965). See also, Infusaid Corp. v. Intermedics Infusaid, Inc., 739 F.2d 661,
668 (1st Cir. 1984) ("[Tjhe general rule is that if there is an adequate remedy at law,
equitable relief is unavailable."); Suchan v. Rutherford, 90 Ida. 288, 295, 410 P.2d
434, 438 (1966) ("[E]quity will not intervene where the aggrieved party has a plain,
speedy, adequate, and complete remedy at law."); Smith v. Hauser 262 N.C. 697, 701,
138 S.E.2d 501, 504 (1964) ("[E]quity is intended to supplement, and not usurp the
functions of the courts of law").
18. In the United States, the distinction between law and equity has become
somewhat blurred since the two systems - separate and distinct at English common
law - have been merged into one. See James, supra note 16.
19. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433 (1830).
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remedies were administered." 0 Justice Story went on to ex-
plain that the Seventh Amendment may be "construed to em-
brace all suits which are not of equity and admiralty
jurisdiction. "21
Of course, new causes of action encompassing newly cre-
ated rights and remedies have been enacted at legislative ses-
sions. Many of these could never have been foreseen by the
framers at the time the Seventh Amendment was adopted. It
is difficult to determine whether some of these new causes of
action are legal or equitable in the Seventh Amendment con-
text. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that many
complex statutes provide for both legal and equitable reme-
dies.22 When the legislature is silent on the jury trial issue in a
statute, the courts determine its closest historical analogy to
decide how the case should be tried.23 The Clean Water Act24
falls clearly into this category. The Supreme Court addressed
the right to a jury trial under this statute in United States v.
Tull.25
III. Facts of Tull and the Lower Court Decisions
In 1981, the government sued Edward Tull pursuant to
the Clean Water Act in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia.2 The government charged
20. Id. at 447.
21. Id. See also Insurance Company v. Comstock, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 258, 269
(1872).
22. See, e.g., Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
23. James, supra note 16, at 656.
24. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
25. 107 S. Ct. 1831 (1987).
26. United States v. Tull, 615 F. Supp. 610, 622 (E.D. Va. 1983). The purpose of
the Clean Water Act is to enhance the federal government's power to prohibit private
parties from obstructing the navigable waters of the United States. Id. at 622; United
States v. Logan & Craig Charter Service, Inc., 676 F.2d 1216, 1218 (8th Cir. 1982).
The Act was established to "restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biologi-
cal integrity of the Nation's waters." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) autho-
rizes suits for injunctive relief against violators of the Clean Water Act, and 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(d) provided for civil penalties of up to $10,000 per day. The legislative history
of the Clean Water Act illustrates that Congress intended that the need for "retribu-
tion," "deterrence," and "restitution" should all be considered when civil penalties
[Vol. 4
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Tull with discharging fill and other pollutants27 into "wet-
lands adjacent to navigable waterways" without a permit from
the United States Army Corps of Engineers. 28 This activity,
according to the government, continued for eight years
throughout three locations in eastern Virginia: Ocean Breeze
Mobile Home Sites, Mire Pond Properties, and Eel Creek.
The Act unambiguously requires a permit if a developer
wishes to discharge "dredged"80 or "fill ''31 materials into the
are imposed. 123 Cong Rec. 39191 (1977) (Sen. Muskie commenting).
33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) was amended in 1987 by the Water Quality Control Act. This
statute allows for the imposition of civil penalties of up to $25,000 per day for each
violation.
In determining the amount of a civil penalty the court shall consider the seri-
ousness of the violation or violations, the economic benefit (if any) resulting
from the violation, any history of such violations, any good-faith efforts to
comply with the applicable requirements, the economic impact of the penalty
on the violator, and such other matters as justice may require.
Id.
27. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (1982) ("Pollutant" is defined as "[any] dredged spoil,
solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical
wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equip-
ment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste, dis-
carded into water.").
28. Under the Act, the Secretary of the Army is charged with issuing permits for
such discharges. Tull v. United States, 769 F.2d 182, 183 (4th Cir. 1985). The Secre-
tary has, in turn, delegated this task to the Corps of Engineers. 33 C.F.R. § 325.8
(1987).
29. Tull, 769 F.2d at 184.
30. "Dredged material" is defined as any material which is "excavated or
dredged from waters of the United States." 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (1987). "Discharge of
dredged material" is defined as
any addition of dredged material into the waters of the United States. The
term includes, without limitation, the addition of dredged material to a speci-
fied discharge site located in waters of the United States and the runoff or
overflow from a contained land or water disposal area ... The term does not
include plowing, cultivating, seeding and harvesting for the production of
food, fiber, and forest products. The term does not include de minimus, inci-
dental soil movement occurring during normal dredging operations.
Id. at § 323.2(d).
31. "Fill material" is defined as "any material used for the primary purpose of
replacing an aquatic area with dry land or of changing the bottom elevation of [a]
waterbody." 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e) (1987). "Discharge of fill material" is defined as
the addition of fill material into waters of the United States. The term gener-
ally includes, without limitation, the following activities: placement of fill
that is necessary for the construction of any structure in a water of the
United States; the building of any structure or impoundment requiring rock,
1987]
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navigable waters of the United States.2 "Navigable waters"
include all "waters of the United States, including the territo-
rial seas."3 3 Indeed, Congress intended to give the term a very
broad reading;34 nevertheless, regulations have been more ex-
plicit.3 1 "Wetlands '36 adjacent" to navigable waters of the
United States are within the jurisdiction of the Corps. 8
sand, dirt, or other material for its construction; site-development fills for
recreational, industrial, commercial, residential, and other uses; causeways or
road fills; dams and dikes; artificial islands; property protection and/or recla-
mation devices such as riprap, groins, seawalls, breakwaters, and revetments;
beach nourishment; levees; fill for structures such as sewage treatment facili-
ties, intake and outfall pipes associated with power plants and subaqueous
utility lines; and artificial reefs.
33 C.F.R. § 323.2(f) (1987).
32. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1344(a).
33. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). "The limit of jurisdiction in the territorial seas is mea-
sured from the baseline in a seaward direction a distance of three nautical miles." 33
C.F.R. § 328.4(a) (1987). "Generally, where the shore directly contacts the open sea,
the line on the shore reached by the ordinary low tides comprises the baseline from
which the distance of three geographic miles is measured." 33 C.F.R. § 329.12(a)(1)
(1987).
34. Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184, 1186 (Ct.Cl. 1981), cert. de-
nied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982); United States v. Oxford Royal Mushroom Products, 487
F. Supp. 852, 854-55 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (The waters need not be navigable in fact, but
only potentially navigable.).
35. United States v. Tull, 615 F. Supp. 610, 623 (E.D. Va. 1983) (quoting 33
C.F.R. § 323.2(b) (1981)) "Navigable waters of the United States" has been defined to
mean: "Those waters that are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide shoreward to the
mean high water mark and/or are presently used, or have been used in the past, or
may be susceptible to use to transport interstate or foreign commerce." The term
"high water mark" is defined as
that line on the shore established by the fluctuations of water and indicated
by physical characteristics such as a clear, natural line impressed on the
bank, shelving, changes in the character of soil, destruction of terrestrial veg-
etation, the presence of litter and debris, or other appropriate means that
consider the characteristics of the surrounding areas.
33 C.F.R. § 328.3(e) (1987).
36. "Wetlands" include areas that are "inundated or saturated by surface or
ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under nor-
mal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in
saturated soil conditions. Wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, bogs and sim-
ilar areas." Id. (quoting 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (1981)).
37. "Adjacent" means bordering, contiguous, or neighboring. Id. at 33 C.F.R.
§ 323.2(d).
38. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 455 (1985)
("The evident breadth of congressional concern for protection of water quality and
aquatic ecosystems suggests that it is reasonable for the Corps to interpret the term
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol4/iss2/5
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The District Court denied Tull's timely demand for a jury
trial and heard the case over his objection.39 The court found
that Tull had violated the Clean Water Act by placing fill on
Ocean Breeze (1975), Mire Pond (1978), and Eel Creek
(1980)." 0 Furthermore, the court found that no permit was
ever issued (or even applied for) for this disposal. 1
The court rejected Tull's contention that no permit was
required for the dumping because the aforementioned proper-
ties did not fall within the definition of "wetlands.""2 Twelve
government expert witnesses, as well as a court-appointed ex-
pert witness, unequivocally rebutted Tull's claim. 43 The court
assessed a total of $75,00044 in fines against Tull for violating
the Act. In addition, the court issued an injunction requiring
Tull to clean up all three properties.4 5 The Court of Appeals
affirmed the District Court's order and held that Tull had no
right to a jury trial because the remedies sought were "equita-
ble" rather than "legal. '4 6
IV. The Test Determining Right to Jury Trial Under the
Seventh Amendment
Given the facts of Tull, it is necessary to apply the test
which the Supreme Court has developed to determine
whether a jury trial is appropriate. The determinative inquiry
is whether the suit in question would have been litigated in
'waters' to encompass wetlands adjacent to waters as more conventionally defined.").
39. Tull, 769 F.2d 183 (4th Cir. 1985).
40. Id. at 184.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 184-85. The District Court found that Tull's properties contained peat,
Spartina alterniflora and Spartina patens. All of these are wetland species. United
States v. Tull, 615 F. Supp. 610, 618-19.
44. Id. at 185. This amount was only a fraction of the almost $23,000,000 the
government sued for. A breakdown of the $75,000 fine is as follows: Ocean Breeze
Mobile Home Cites ($35,000), Mire Pond Properties ($35,000), and Eel Creek
($5,000). United States v. Tull, 615 F. Supp. 610, 626 (E.D. Va. 1983).
45. Tull, 769 F.2d at 185. Tull was also ordered to pay fines and restore other
properties for violating the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act. 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-
467 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
46. Tull, 769 F.2d at 188.
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the courts of law or courts of equity in 1791,"1 the year the
Seventh Amendment was adopted. "Because the Seventh
Amendment demands preservation of the jury trial right, our
cases have uniformly held that the content of the right must
be judged by historical standards. '4a In other words, "[i]f a
jury would have been impanelled in a particular kind of case
in 1791, then the Seventh Amendment requires a jury trial
today, if either party so desires.""
The Seventh Amendment has been interpreted to require
a jury trial in actions "unheard of at common law" so long as
the "rights and remedies" involved are legal rather than equi-
table in nature."
A. Development of the Test
The Supreme Court developed and refined this analysis
in a series of cases beginning in 1959 with Beacon Theaters v.
Westover." All of the cases in this series involved situations
in which both legal and equitable issues arose in the same ac-
tion. In Beacon Theatres, Fox West Coast Theatres, Inc.
brought an action for declaratory relief arising out of alleged
47. See generally Clements, The Right To Jury Trial Under The Clean Water
Act - The Jury Is Still Out, 41 U. Miami L. Rev. 665, 685 (1987). That article pro-
vides a detailed analysis of the lower court holdings in Tull. This note primarily ad-
dresses the problems raised by the Supreme Court's decision and analysis.
48. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 344 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.
dissenting).
49. Id. at 345; Dimick v. Scheidt, 293 U.S. 474, 476. "In order to ascertain the
scope and meaning of the Seventh Amendment, resort must be had to the appropri-
ate rules of the common law established at the time of the adoption of that constitu-
tional provision in 1791." Id.
A good example of the application of this test is NSC International Corp. v.
Ryan, 531 F. Supp. 362, 363 (N.D. Ill. 1981). The court held that the plaintiff's action
for treble damages under RICO, a statute that provides for legal and equitable relief,
most closely resembled an action for tortious interference with economic relations.
Therefore, since the closest historical analogy was legal rather than equitable, the
court granted plaintiff's demand for a jury trial. Id.
50. Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974). "The Seventh Amendment
requires trial by jury in actions unheard of at common law so long" as the rights and
remedies at issue were traditionally enforced in actions at law, rather than in equity
or admiralty. Id. at 375.
51. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol4/iss2/5
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violations of federal antitrust laws.2 Fox's complaint prayed
for a declaration that Beacon Theatres had violated the afore-
mentioned acts, as well as for an injunction to prevent Beacon
Theatres from instituting any actions of its own during the
proceeding.53  Beacon Theatres answered and counter-
claimed5" for treble damages.5 5 Beacon Theatres also de-
manded a jury trial on the counter-claim. 6 Reversing the
lower courts, the Supreme Court held that Beacon Theatres
was entitled to a jury trial on its counter-claim.57 Since money
damages constitute a "legal" remedy, a claim for treble dam-
ages would normally get a jury trial.5 8 Beacon Theatres could
not be deprived of that right simply because Fox sued first. 9
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, legal and equita-
ble issues may be tried in the same case.60 "[O]nly under the
most imperative circumstances ... which ... we cannot now
anticipate, can the right to a jury trial of legal issues be lost
through prior determination of equitable claims.""1 Therefore,
the legal issues must be tried first in such cases.2 This often
has critical implications with regard to the doctrines of res
judicata and collateral estoppel, since the factual issues, once
determined by the jury on the legal claims are applied to the
court's decision on the equitable claims. 3
The second case in this landmark series of decisions is
Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood." In Dairy Queen, the owners of
52. Id. at 502.
53. Id. at 502-03.
54. Counter-claims are filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 13.
55. Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 503.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 508.
58. Id. at 503.
59. Id.
60. Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a) allows for joinder of claims.
61. Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 510-11. See also, Guajardo v. Estelle, 580 F.2d
748, 752 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that the "jury-generating" aspect of a legal claim is
not lost by joinder with equitable claims).
62. 5 J. Moore, J. Lucas, G. Grotheer, Moore's Federal Practice 38.16(2) (2d
ed. 1987).
63. For a discussion on the res judicata issue, see Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore
439 U.S. 322 (1979).
64. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
1987]
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the "DAIRY QUEEN" trademark had contracted with the de-
fendant for the exclusive use of the trademark in parts of
Pennsylvania. When a dispute arose concerning its use, the
owners of the trademark sued for breach of contract and
trademark infringement." The plaintiff sought an injunction
to prevent the defendant from continuing to use the trade-
mark and for an accounting to determine the amount owed for
the initial use.6 The defendant demanded a jury trial.6 7 The
plaintiff-respondent argued that the claim was purely equita-
ble because it prayed for an accounting rather than actual
money damages.68 The Supreme Court reversed the District
Court's holding (which the Court of Appeals had affirmed)6 9
and, citing Beacon Theatres, held that where both legal and
equitable issues arise in a single case, all legal issues are enti-
tled to a jury trial on the facts.7 ° Moreover, the accounting
claim is not rendered equitable by the choice of words used in
the pleading. 1 Such a cause of action is cognizable at law and
provides for a legal remedy. 72 The Dairy Queen Court clari-
fied the holding in Beacon Theatres by stating: "Beacon
Theatres requires that any legal issues for which a trial by
jury is timely and properly demanded be submitted to a
jury."'73 The Dairy Queen Court added, however, that the rule
of Beacon Theatres applies even when the trial judge classi-
fies the legal issues as incidental to the equitable ones. 4
Ross v. Bernhard75 is the third pertinent case in this line.
In Ross, a group of plaintiffs brought a stockholders' deriva-
65. Id. at 473.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 476.
68. Id. at 477.
69. 194 F. Supp. 686 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd., 290 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1961).
70. Dairy Queen, 369 U.S. at 472-73.
71. Id. at 477-78.
72. Id. at 478-79. Historically, a suit in equity could be brought only where there
was an inadequate remedy at law. The Dairy Queen court reasoned that a court of
law is perfectly able to determine an accounting. It is not so complex that it requires
an equitable determination. Id.
73. Id. at 473.
74. Id.
75. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol4/iss2/5
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tive suit against the directors of Lebanon Corporation, a
closed-end investment company, accusing them of unlawfully
converting corporate assets and "gross abuse of trust. 76 As in
Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen, the Ross complaint in-
volved equitable as well as legal issues." The Supreme Court
reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals,78 which rea-
soned that a derivative action of this sort was purely equita-
ble, and held that the right to a jury trial on the legal claim
for damages "is not forfeited merely because the stockholder's
right to sue must first be adjudicated as an equitable issue
triable to the court. '7 9 In Ross, Justice White explained that
the "Seventh Amendment question depends on the nature of
the issue to be tried rather than the character of the overall
action."' 0 The Court continued this analysis by listing three
factors that must be considered when determining the Sev-
enth Amendment right: first, the "nature" of the issue in light
of the pre-merger custom; second, the remedy sought; and
third, the "practical abilities and limitations of juries."'"
76. Id. at 531.
77. Id. at 537-38. The equitable issue involved the right of the stockholders to
sue on behalf of the corporation. The legal issue was the claim for money damages by
the corporation against its directors. Id. at 538.
78. Ross v. Bernhard, 403 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968).
79. Ross, 396 U.S. at 539.
80. Id. at 538. See also, Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221 (1963) (holding that an
action by a lawyer to recover fees from a client is legal in character and should be
granted a jury trial).
81. Ross, 396 U.S. 538 n.10. When the Ross decision was handed down, footnote
10 attracted a great deal of controversy. It left open the question of whether courts
must take into account the practical abilities and limitations of juries in resolving the
Seventh Amendment question. It is generally held, however, that such factors should
not be taken into consideration. In re U.S. Financial Securities Litigation, 609 F.2d
411, 425 (9th Cir. 1979).
Concerning footnote 10 of Ross, it has been suggested that it is "so cursory, con-
clusory and devoid of cited authority or reasoned analysis that it is difficult to believe
it could have been intended to reject such established historical practice or Supreme
Court precedent." Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the
Irrationality of Rational Decision Making, 70 Nw. U.L. Rev. 486, 526 (1975). See
generally, Devlin, Jury Trial In Complex Cases: English Practice At The Time Of
The Seventh Amendment, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 43 (1980); Arnold, A Historical Inquiry
Into The Right To Trial By Jury In Complex Civil Litigation, 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 829
(1980).
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In Curtis v. Loether,2 the fourth case in this series, the
Supreme Court unambiguously reaffirmed its position on the
jury trial issue:
[W]hen Congress provides for enforcement of statutory
rights in an ordinary civil action in the district courts,
where there is obviously no functional justification for de-
nying the jury trial right, a jury trial must be available if
the action involves rights and remedies of the sort typi-
cally enforced in an action at law.8 3
The Curtis court, however, reminds us that if improprieties
arise in the jury trial, the trial judge retains the power to hand
down a directed verdict, judgment n.o.v., or, if the situation
requires, a new trial may be granted at the judge's
discretion."
A number of recent federal court decisions have reiter-
ated the point that where both legal and equitable claims ap-
pear in the same case, issues of fact common to both must be
decided by a jury if one is demanded, and the legal claims
must be decided prior to those which are deemed to be
equitable. 5
Procedurally, the Tull case is similar to Beacon Theatres,
Dairy Queen, Ross, and Curtis. The government's complaint
gives rise to legal as well as equitable issues. A claim for civil
penalties is, by its nature, legal, while a claim for injunctive
relief is equitable in nature. Therefore, under the Beacon
Theatres line of cases, Edward Tull was deprived of his Sev-
enth Amendment right to a jury trial as to the facts relating
to the legal claim.
82. 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
83. Id. at 195. The right to a jury trial on the facts has explicitly been upheld
when the U.S. Government is bringing suit to collect civil penalties, even if the stat-
ute is silent on the jury trial issue. United States v. J.B. Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414,
422 (2d Cir. 1974).
84. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 198.
85. Turner v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Co., 602 F. Supp. 519, 525 (M.D. La.
1984); Roscello v. Southwest Airlines, Co., 726 F.2d 217, 221, reh'g denied, 732 F.2d
941 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc); Tull v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 1831, 1835 n.3 (1987).
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V. The Supreme Court Decision
A. The Majority Decision
The Supreme Court first addressed the preliminary issue
of whether a construction of the Clean Water Act is "fairly
possible by which the [constitutional] question may be
avoided." 86 The Court concluded that nothing in either the
statute itself, or its legislative history, "implies any congres-
sional intent to grant defendants the right of a jury trial dur-
ing the liability or penalty phase of the civil suit proceed-
ing."' 87 Therefore, the Court concluded that it must answer
the constitutional question.
In Tull, the Supreme Court held that the defendant was
entitled to a jury trial on the issue of liability, but that the
amount of damages was a matter of judicial discretion. The
Court reasoned that since the government sought civil penal-
ties as well as injunctive relief, the suit was more analogous to
a common law action in debt than a traditional equitable ac-
tion.8 9 The Court rejected Tull's claim that a better historical
analogy was to a public nuisance action, which was historically
equitable.90 The government's final contention, that the in-
stant case is similar to an action for disgorgement of improper
profits (traditionally equitable) is a poor analogy. That cause
of action, the Court said, provides for a restitutionary remedy,
86. Tull, 107 S. Ct. at 1835 n.3.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1839-40.
89. Id. at 1836. See Regan, 232 U.S. 37 (1914).
90. Tull, 107 S. Ct. at 1837. The Court held, however, that the issue need not be
decided because both analogies are appropriate. The purpose of an action for public
nuisance was to provide a civil remedy to redress "a miscellaneous and diversified
group of minor criminal offenses, based on some interference with the interests of the
community, or the comfort or convenience of the general public." Id. (quoting W.
Prosser, Handbook on the Law of Torts 583-85 (4th ed. 1971)). Some examples of
public nuisance included:
interferences with the public health, as in the case of a hogpen, the keeping
of diseased animals, or a malarial pond; with public safety, as in the case of
the storage of explosives ... with public morals; ... with public comfort, as
in the case of bad odors, smoke, dust; . . . with public convenience, as by
obstructing a highway or a navigable stream.
Tull, 107 S. Ct. at 1837 n.5 (quoting Prosser, Law of Torts at 583-85).
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which is a more limited remedy than a civil fine.9'
The second part of the Court's holding denied Tull a jury
trial as to the amount of the penalty.92 Writing for the major-
ity, Justice Brennan explained that such a decision does not
involve the "substance of a common-law right to a jury
trial,"93 nor does it involve a "fundamental element of a jury
trial."9 Congress may delegate such a determination to the
trial judges.9 5 In addition, the Court asserted that "highly dis-
cretionary calculations that take into account multiple fac-
tors"9 " are normally performed by judges.9 7 Citing Colgrove v.
Battin,9 a the Supreme Court reasoned that the inquiry de-
pends on whether "the jury must shoulder this responsibility
as necessary to preserve the 'substance of the common-law
right of trial by jury.' 99 The Tull Court concluded that this
is not the jury's purpose. 00
B. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Scalia, joined only by Justice Stevens, dissented
from the last part of the majority's opinion - that a determi-
nation concerning the amount of damages should not have
gone to the jury.1"' These Justices criticize the majority's
91. Id. at 1839. It is the government's contention that if the Seventh Amend-
ment right is to attach, the cause of action, as well as the remedy sought, must both
be legal in nature. The government's amended complaint divides the statute's action
for civil penalties into a cause of action and a remedy, and "analyzes each component
as if the other were irrelevant." Id. at 1837 n.6. The Court flatly rejected this ap-
proach stating; "[olur search is for a single historical analogue, taking into considera-
tion the nature of the cause of action and the remedy as two important factors." Id.
at 1840.
92. Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens dissented from this section of the opinion.
Id. at 1840-41.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. The Court concluded that the statute's legislative history indicated that
judges should perform such calculations. Id. at 1839 (citing 123 Cong. Rec. 39190-
39191).
97. Tull, 107 S. Ct. at 1840.
98. 413 U.S. 149 (1973).
99. Tul, 107 S. Ct. at 1840 (quoting Colgrove, 413 U.S. at 157).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1840-41 (1987) (Scalia, J. dissenting).
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opinion as creating a new "form of civil adjudication." The
dissenters assert that since the Court drew an analogy be-
tween the case at bar and a common law debt action, a jury
should determine damages (as they did in common law debt
cases).102 However, it is noteworthy that the dissenters do not
cite any authority for their position.
C. Analysis
What makes the Tull decision disturbing is the majority's
misreading of Colgrove v. Battin.'°3 The Court in Colgrove
stated that the Supreme Court has historically defined the
jury trial right preserved in cases covered by the Seventh
Amendment as "the substance of the common-law right of
trial by jury, as distinguished from mere matters of form or
procedure ...., Procedural matters in civil cases such as
jury size'0 5 and unanimity' ° may vary, depending on the ju-
risdiction.1 07 The majority erred in failing to categorize the
determination of civil penalties as part of the "substance of
the common-law right"'' 0 of the jury trial under the Seventh
Amendment.
The dissenters in Tull assert that by splitting the issues
of liability and assessment of civil penalties between the judge
and jury, the majority creates "a new form of civil adjudica-
tion."'' 09 Tull leaves open some questions regarding the role of
102. Id.
103. 413 U.S. 149 (1973).
104. Id. at 156; Baltimore and Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657
(1935); see also Scott, Trial By Jury And The Reform Of Civil Procedure, 31 Harv.
L. Rev. 669 (1918).
105. Colgrove, 413 U.S. at 160; see also Cooley v. Strickland Transportation Co.,
459 F.2d 779 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 923 (1973), reh'g denied 414 U.S.
882 (1973) (holding that Federal District Courts may make local rules that allow only
a six member jury in civil cases rather than twelve); Fletcher v. McCreary Tire and
Rubber Co., 773 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1985); Calhoun v. United States, 591 F.2d 1243
(9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1118 (1979) (holding that in a taxpayer's action
seeking a federal income tax refund, the taxpayer is not entitled to a twelve member
jury). See also Milliron v. Baker, 352 F. Supp. 495 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
106. Scott, supra note 104, 31 Harv. L. Rev. at 674 (1918).
107. Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 390 (1942).
108. Tull, 107 S. Ct. at 1840.
109. Id. at 1841.
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the jury in fixing remedies.
1. Assessment of Damages
While the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on this pre-
cise issue, the Circuit Courts have settled the point that when
the issue of liability is submitted to a jury, the task of deter-
mining damages is also submitted. In Hawkes v. Ayers,110 the
Fifth Circuit stated that "[a] fundamental principle of Ameri-
can jurisprudence is that the fact-finder determines the quan-
tum of damages in civil cases." '' In Borough v. Duluth, Mis-
sabe & Iron Range Ry. Co.,112 the Eighth Circuit clearly
articulated the principle that the "calculation of damages" is
a question "of fact and peculiarly within the province of the
jury." ''3 Other circuits have also accepted this position." 4 In
these cases, the Supreme Court has consistently denied certio-
rari and let the Circuit Court decisions stand. Therefore,
when a jury has been chosen to decide a civil case, that entity
should also determine the amount of damages to be awarded,
since it is clearly a question of fact.
2. Assessment of Civil Penalties
While damages can be either compensatory or punitive in
nature, penalties are mainly punitive."' The jury's role in the
determination of damages has been well settled in the law for
some time," 6 but its role in the determination of civil penal-
ties is much less clear, and has been the subject of a consider-
able amount of debate. This is particularly true in complex
civil litigation. Periodically, it has been argued that there
110. 537 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1976).
111. Id. at 837.
112. 762 F.2d 66 (8th Cir. 1985).
113. Id. at 69. See also Herold v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 761 F.2d 1241, 1248
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 208 (1985) ("The assessment of damages lies within
the sound discretion of the jury.").
114. See Rosen v. LTV Recreational Development, Inc., 569 F.2d 1117 (10th Cir.
1978) (holding that the fixing of damages is the peculiar function of the jury, or of the
trial judge if there is no jury).
115. D. Dobbs, Handbook On The Law Of Remedies 135, 204-05 (1973).
116. See supra notes 112, and infra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
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should be a general exception to the jury trial rule for com-
plex cases. 117 However, attempts to advance this argument
have been rejected by the courts."' It would be difficult, if not
impossible, to develop a workable test to determine which
cases are "complex" and which ones are not."19 In addition,
juries have consistently shown, albeit with some exceptions,
that they are capable of unraveling complex factual issues.12 1
Products liability, medical malpractice, and securities cases
are frequently cited examples of cases presenting complex
issues."'
Should the issue of statutory civil penalties be decided by
the jury in suits brought under the Clean Water Act? Clearly,
the greatest advantage that would result from not submitting
the civil penalty issue to the jury is the promotion of judicial
economy. As the federal court dockets have become over-
whelmed with pending litigation, this is an immediate con-
cern. Another advantage that would result from making pen-
alties a matter for judicial determination is the elimination of
juror prejudice. However, the benefits that would be derived
therefrom undermine the historical, pervasive faith that has
been placed in the jury system. Any legal or political system
must have the support of the citizenry it is designed to serve.
Without such support, the system loses the very credibility
that is so crucial to its longevity.
Based on the foregoing analysis, it is this author's conten-
tion that, despite the frequent objections to the use of the
jury in determining complex factual issues, the balance must
tilt in its favor. Prospectively, it appears that the Supreme
Court's decision in Tull will create further uncertainty in this
area, not only with regard to complex environmental statutes,
but with complex statutes in many areas of the law.
117. See In re U.S. Financial Securities, 609 F.2d 411, 427 (9th Cir. 1979).
118. Id. at 427-31.
119. Id. at 431.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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VI. Conclusion
The Supreme Court's decision in Tull represents that
Court's refusal to narrow the scope of the Seventh Amend-
ment right which is guaranteed to parties litigating in the fed-
eral courts. The Circuit Court of Appeals was clearly mis-
guided in its handling of the issues presented to it.
Tull clearly falls within the line of cases beginning with
Beacon Theatres insofar as it gives rise to both legal and eq-
uitable claims. Thus, in following the doctrine of stare decisis,
the Supreme Court took a major step in clarifying and reaf-
firming its commitment to its past holdings on the Seventh
Amendment issue. The Court did, however, create further un-
certainty regarding the role of the civil jury in the determina-
tion of statutory civil penalties. Under the Seventh Amend-
ment, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the case law
since Beacon Theatres v. Westover, Edward Tull should have
been granted a jury trial on the facts of all the legal claims,
including the issue of the amount of the penalty.
Richard S. Altman
[Vol. 4
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol4/iss2/5
